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I. Ethiopian-Somalis: From Subjects to Citizens?1
When asked by an interviewer whether he felt more Somali or more 
Ethiopian, Sultan Korfa Garane Ahmed, a federal member of parlia-
ment representing part of Ethiopia’s Somali Region, diplomatically 
responded: “I am an Ethiopian-Somali.”2 The MP’s self-description as 
an Ethiopian-Somali highlights two crucial implications for the analy-
sis of contemporary politics in what was formerly known as the Oga-
den and is today referred to as the Somali Regional State or simply 
Region 5. For the first time in the history of the Ethiopian empire-state 
or, more precisely, since the forced incorporation of the Somali inhab-
ited Ogaden into Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century, the Somalis 
are officially recognized as one of the country’s “nations, nationalities 
and peoples.” Since the accession to power of the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991, attempts to 
forge a distinct “Ethiopian-Somali” or “Somali-Ethiopian” identity 
have superseded the former regimes’ patronizing attitudes toward the 
country’s “subject nationalities.”3
Throughout history Abyssinia and Somalia were perceived as two 
diametrically opposed collectives, identities, and principles.4 In ste-
reotypical yet politically instrumental terms, Ethiopians and Somalis 
identified themselves as opposites in linguistic (Semitic vs. Cushitic), 
religious (Christian vs. Muslim), economic (settled cultivators vs. 
transhumant pastoralists), and political (hierarchical feudalism vs. 
egalitarian segmentary kinship) respects. From Ahmed Ibrahim 
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al-Ghazi’s (Gran or Gurey) 16th century jihad against highland Ethio-
pia to Mahammad ‘Abdille Hasan’s Dervish fighters at the end of the 
19th century and from the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden war (1977–78) to 
the recent presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia’s Gedo, Bay, and 
Bakool regions, Ethiopians and Somalis generally viewed one another 
as members of mutually exclusive social universes. This holds par-
ticularly true for those Somali clan lineages that inhabit and migrate 
within the 250,000 km2 territory of Region 5. The invention of an Ethio-
pian-Somali identity thus bears symbolic significance, as it had hith-
erto been regarded as something out of the question. In addition, to 
the critically minded observer, Sultan Korfa’s statement raises a sec-
ond problem: despite their newly found status as Ethiopian citizens, 
the political destiny and identity of the Somalis inhabiting Ethiopia’s 
southeastern lowlands remain heavily contested.
For the researcher this entails the difficulty of circumventing the 
antagonistic and politicized narratives that dominate the discourse 
about and explanations of the Somali Region.5 As we shall see, the 
idea of an Ethiopian-Somali identity represents only one (and a heav-
ily disputed) position in a broad spectrum of identifications. If Ethio-
pian-Somali identity remains disputed, the lenses through which this 
problem has been apprehended have themselves evolved over time.6 
Between Somalia’s independence in 1960 and state collapse in 1991, the 
“Ogaden problem” was mainly perceived as a colonial legacy clashing 
with the pan-Somali agenda of reunifying all Somali inhabited ter-
ritories.7 The Somali government spoke of Ethiopian occupation and 
colonization (Somali Democratic Republic 1974), while Ethiopians con-
tested the idea of a “Greater Somalia” and the validity of its neighbor’s 
nationalist claims.8 In international political forums the Ogaden was 
framed and addressed by Ethiopianists as an international border dis-
pute between sovereign nation-states.9 With the demise of the Somali 
state and the internal rearrangement of the Ethiopian state in 1991, 
politics in the Ogaden took a new twist. Somalia unwillingly lost its 
irredentist claim, while the new Ethiopian regime extended an invita-
tion to Ethiopian-Somali leaders to participate in the organization of a 
new ethnically based regional state.
Although fifteen years have passed since the end of the military-
socialist Derg regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, our review of 
the political and institutional dynamics in the Somali Region demon-
strates that the issue of Ethiopian-Somali self-determination, within 
or outside the Ethiopian framework, is far from settled. As we shall 
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argue, for political, economic, and genealogical reasons, Ethiopian-
Somalis are torn between integration into Ethiopia, independence on 
the basis of the right to self-determination, and the irredentist claims 
of the now defunct Somali Democratic Republic to Somali-inhabited 
territories beyond its borders. This article argues that the recognition 
of an Ethiopian-Somali polity has neither translated into democratic 
or effective working relations between the federal government and its 
Somali regional state nor, for that matter, increased mutual apprecia-
tion between highland Ethiopians and Somalis. In the first section of 
the essay, we review important developments in the formal political 
arena of the region since 1991, with a special focus on party politics. A 
second section looks at how the new principle of “ethnic federalism” 
was implemented and how it affected Ethiopian-Somalis in Ethiopia’s 
Somali region. The third part outlines the federal government’s inter-
ventions and evolving agenda towards its Somali periphery. Fourthly, 
we discuss the contested political identities of Ethiopian-Somalis 
alluded to in the introduction. Finally, this article concludes with a 
discussion of the historic continuities and ruptures of the relations 
between highland Ethiopia and its Somali subjects-cum-citizens.
II. 1991: A New Beginning
Ever since the 1977–78 Ethiopian-Somali war, the Somali region has 
remained a theatre of political turmoil. Following the war, an esti-
mated 800,000 Ethiopian Somalis crossed the border to neighboring 
Somalia, where they lived in refugee camps for the next decade and a 
half.10 But the victory of Ethiopia over its Somali and Western Somali 
Liberation Front (WSLF) adversaries did not lead to an effective paci-
fication of the area. The international media departed with the official 
end of the inter-state war, affording the Derg regime a free hand in 
meting out a brutal dose of civilian abuses. Counterinsurgency cam-
paigns against remnants of Somali and Oromo guerrilla groups cul-
minated in the forcible relocation of local inhabitants into restricted 
villages, indiscriminate aerial bombardment, and “fragmented wars” 
between armed proxy groups.11 During the early 1980s, the Ogaden 
was rendered a vast military zone. Ethiopian-Somalis often allude to 
the Derg’s rule over the Ogaden and the associated absence of social 
development as corresponding to “30 military camps and one high 
school.”12 A short-lived façade of stability at the beginning of the 1980s 
was rudely disturbed by the 1983–84 famine. Deprived of traditional 
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livelihood mechanisms of cross-border movement, trading, and culti-
vation, the Ogaden population plunged into a famine situation long 
before the whole country in 1984.13 In the meantime, the fortunes of the 
WSLF started waning when President Siyaad Barre, in a bid to save his 
failing regime, signed a peace agreement with Mengistu Haile Mariam 
in Djibouti in April 1988.
By the time the EPRDF took charge in Addis Ababa in May 1991, 
the Somali Region was once again in a state of political confusion. State 
collapse, famine, and civil strife in neighboring Somalia had led to a 
massive influx of Somalis who sought refuge in the Ogaden region. By 
mid-1992 an estimated 594,000 refugees and 117,000 returnees found 
their way to the northern part of the region.14 The Derg had not left 
a workable institutional framework that was capable of guiding the 
region out of the mounting political and humanitarian crisis.15 It was 
against that backdrop that the EPRDF had a hard time identifying the 
right people and organizations to invite to the July 1991 Addis Ababa 
transitional conference. In the absence of a bona fide Ethiopian-Somali 
representative organization, the EPRDF allocated three seats to WSLF 
and one seat to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Despite 
Meles Zenawi’s prolonged stay in Mogadishu in the 1980s, he did not 
give the Somalis much say in deciding who should represent them at 
the transitional conference. The little influence they enjoyed in shap-
ing the future of nascent federal Ethiopia was also illustrative of their 
internal divisions.16 This said, the Somali Region for the first time expe-
rienced a period of political pluralism during the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) as a multitude of clan-based political parties came 
to the scene, beginning to jockey for power and influence. In the first 
half of the 1990s, more than a dozen parties established their head-
quarters in Jigjiga, leading to a situation that an observer jokingly 
remembered as follows: “There were so many party flags in town, you 
could have thought it was the United Nations.”17
The first regional government was formed by the ONLF, which 
won over 60% of the parliamentary seats in the June 1992 elections.18 
Technically speaking, the reign of the ONLF, headed by Abdul-
lahi Mohamed Saadi, lasted barely a year. The next two presidents 
belonged to the WSLF or were independent candidates associated with 
the ONLF on grounds of a shared genealogical background. The ONLF 
regime, reflective of the failure, crisis, and contradictions of the WSLF 
leadership and agenda in the 1980s, was characterized by uncertainty, 
disorganization, and a haphazard groping for direction. Most of the 
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first cabinet’s time was spent in Addis Ababa on the pretext of get-
ting acquainted with the TFG and attempting to secure the region’s 
budget.19 Like the exiled WSLF officials, these returnee politicians had 
hardly any knowledge of the issues that mattered to the local people. 
From the start, the mismanagement of public resources, a narrow focus 
on pursuing sectarian interests, and a general lack of responsiveness 
toward the population were characteristic traits of governance in the 
Somali Region. Yet it was not these shortcomings but the request for 
exercising the right to self-determination (i.e., secession from Ethiopia) 
by the Ogaadeen-dominated regional assembly in February 1994 that 
provoked the harsh intervention by the federal government.20
The year 1994 marked a turning point for the Somali Region both 
in terms of its internal power balance and its relations with the federal 
government in Addis Ababa. With the forced removal of the ONLF 
administration, led by President Hassan Gire Qalinle, the honeymoon 
between EPRDF and nationalist Ogaadeen Ethiopian-Somalis came 
to an acrimonious end. The formation of the Ethiopian Somali Demo-
cratic League (ESDL) by ten non-Ogaadeen political parties in early 
1994 corresponded to the delayed establishment of an EPRDF affiliate 
party in the Somali Region.21 Behind the scenes and in anticipation of 
ONLF’s secessionist agenda, the EPRDF had since 1992 devised a strat-
egy for containing the ONLF.22 The circumstances of ESDL’s creation 
were symbolic since the party was inaugurated in the Hurso federal 
military camp (near Dire Dawa) in the presence of then-Prime Minis-
ter Tamrat Layne.23 However, while the ESDL benefited from federal 
support and capacity building in administrative respects, its creation 
was a direct response to what the non-Ogaadeen political parties per-
ceived as ONLF hegemony. While ONLF took the right to secession 
enshrined in the Transitional Charter (FDRE Constitution Article 39) at 
face value, the ESDL “maybe more than others, understood the limits 
of democracy proposed by the regime.”24 The ESDL won a landslide 
victory in the 1995 elections by securing 76 (out of 139) seats in the 
regional House of Peoples’ Representatives and 15 (out of 23 accorded 
to the Somali Region) in the federal one.25 Splits within the ONLF, an 
election boycott by the ONLF’s “hawks,” and the swift rearrangement 
of electoral constituencies to the disadvantage of the Ogaadeen clan 
aided the ESDL’s electoral victory.
From the Ethiopian perspective, EPRDF’s alliance with the ESDL 
marked the appearance of a number of moderate and secular Ethio-
pian-Somali politicians in the region’s political scene. Among them 
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was the late Abdulmejid Hussein, chairman of the ESDL and its succes-
sor, the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), as well as a minister 
and a senior U.N. and Ethiopian diplomat. The influential “ambassa-
dor,” as he was commonly referred to, was trusted by leading cadres of 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Other senior pro-EPRDF 
Ethiopian-Somali politicians who gained prominence during the past 
decade are Shemsudin Ahmed, Abdulrashid Dulane, Dr. Mohamed 
Sarhaye and Mahmoud Dirir. All of them were at one time ministers or 
ambassadors for the federal government and executives in the central 
committee of the Somali Region’s ruling party. As political brokers 
loyal to the EPRDF they represented federal interests at the regional 
level and regional demands at the federal level, thereby constituting 
a vital political link between the federal and regional capitals, Addis 
Ababa and Jigjiga. Through their endorsement of EPRDF’s political 
agenda they obtained federal backing in the region’s internal power 
struggles. Conversely, ever since the arrival to power of the ESDL in 
1994, the Somali Region’s senior politicians have been mostly per-
ceived as “a surrogate of the Addis Ababa federal government.”26 In 
reality, dependence on federal support also meant that the center could 
remove regional cabinets and presidents loyal to the EPRDF whenever 
they “digressed from EPRDF’s agenda.”27 Consequently, dismissals 
of senior politicians and administrators became a recurrent practice 
within the Somali Region. Since 1991, nine successive presidents have 
headed the regional government.28
The ESDL’s fortunes as the ruling party did not last for long. A 
rift between Somali Region President Eid Dahir Farah and various 
members of the party’s executive committee considerably weakened 
the League and eventually led to Eid’s dismissal and imprisonment. 
By the end of 1997, the ESDL had discredited itself in the eyes of the 
Ethiopian-Somali public and had lost the support of federal represen-
tatives.29 The party’s disorder allowed federal authorities to decree 
a merger between the legal ONLF and the remnants of the ESDL. 
In June 1998, the ESDL and legal ONLF elected 35 members to rep-
resent them at the founding convention of the new Somali People’s 
Democratic Party (SPDP). The replacement of the ESDL by the SPDP 
signified a broadening of the pro-EPRDF alliance within the Somali 
Region through the inclusion of moderate Ogaadeen politicians. Even 
so, the SPDP has been “wracked by infighting and political disputes.”30 
Commentators have described the SPDP as incompetent and “corrupt 
beyond description.”31 By 2004, the party’s lack of popular support was 
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widely apparent. Many in the region considered the SPDP a creation of 
the EPRDF and its leaders handpicked by the latter.32 In reality, Region 
5’s ruling party represents a loose pro-EPRDF umbrella under which 
intense political and genealogical competition is played out.
Through its government-aided machinery, the SPDP successfully 
mobilized voters in the 2000 and 2005 national and 2004 district elec-
tions. The 2004 district elections revealed a de facto one-party state in 
the Somali Region under the banner of the SPDP. This was in stark con-
trast to the region’s first multi-party elections to the regional assembly 
of 1992, which were seen as an example of political pluralism.33 Out 
of a total of 3,309 district councillors elected across the region, 3,182 
belonged to the SPDP, 21 to the opposition Western Somali Democratic 
Party (WSDP), and 106 were independent candidates.34 In the disputed 
2005 national and regional elections, the SPDP won 161 mandates in 
the regional parliament (out of 183) and all the region’s seats in the 
federal House of Representatives.35 Part of the SPDP’s electoral success 
and political predominance is due to the effective instrumentalization 
of state administration and resources for political purposes. Addition-
ally, the party benefited from the establishment of a system of govern-
ment-appointed and paid elders at regional, zonal, and district levels. 
These lataliye or amakari elders (“advisor” in Somali and Amharic, 
respectively) were appointed throughout the Somali Region on the 
initiative of the federal government at the beginning of 2000. They 
function as a parallel organizational framework to the formal govern-
ment structure, from the district up to the regional levels.36 Apart from 
assisting local government in matters of peace and security, they have 
been instrumental in campaigning and mobilizing voters during elec-
tion periods.37 The integration of elders and community leaders into 
government was primarily motivated by the Ethiopian state’s need 
to extend government control into rural pastoral areas. Government 
officials rightly conceived of elders as bearers of intimate knowledge 
of the clan lineages they represent and of being capable of mobiliz-
ing their communities.38 Lataliye elders thus act as quasi-governmental 
administrators who disseminate official policy among the population 
and inform bureaucrats about the latest developments within their 
communities.
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III. Ethnic Federalism in the Somali Frontier
In the Somali Region the project of state expansion is still at a com-
paratively embryonic stage. Statistical data on the region’s popula-
tion and livestock are highly unreliable, no geographic map exists that 
indicates the actual boundaries of administrative units such as zones 
and districts of the region, and bureaucratic monopolization of public 
affairs is very limited.39 Ethiopian-Somalis often point out that “the 
government does nothing at all for us”40 and that effective adminis-
tration is confined to a few urban centers like Jigjiga or Godey. State 
institutions are unable to hold a monopoly on violence, raise taxes, or 
provide basic public services. They thereby enjoy little legitimacy in 
the eyes of rural pastoralists. From a historic perspective, the Ogaden 
is one of Ethiopia’s frontiers where state penetration has always been 
much weaker than in the central highlands.41 During the first half of 
the 1990s, the incumbent regime had recognized the need to set up an 
effective administration at the district level as a means to expand state 
control and counter insecurity in Region 5.42 But despite grandstand-
ing rhetoric, the devolution of state power and finances to the region’s 
fifty-three districts has been mainly theoretical. This said, the EPRDF’s 
policy of “ethnic federalism”43 has partly altered politics within the 
region.
The granting of self-rule to Ethiopian-Somalis within Ethiopia’s fed-
eral architecture decisively transformed local politics. While outsiders 
have tended to interpret the internal dynamics of Region 5 exclusively 
in terms of “tribalism,” and “clannishness” as “the categorical impera-
tive of Somali political practice,”44 regional politics go beyond identity 
politics. Rather, three parallel phenomena have characterized the Ethi-
opian-Somali polity in the past one-and-a-half decades.45 First, politi-
cal authority in the Somali Region is predominantly neo-patrimonial. 
It involves federal and regional patrons who are close to the EPRDF 
and its SPDP surrogate leaders as well as clients who seek protection 
and support from their patrons.46 This neo-patrimonial rule is ani-
mated by the coexistence of a politicized, segmented patrilineal kin-
ship structure on the one hand and a legal-rational local government 
and bureaucracy on the other. As a result, rotations, dismissals, and 
changes within regional, zonal, and district executive branches have 
been common ever since 1991.
Second, the hand over of the region’s administration to Ethio-
pian-Somalis resulted in an acute competition for control over state 
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resources. Political leaders, namely, the urban-based elite, usually with 
the support of their respective lineage groups, fought over administra-
tive appointments. They did so primarily to access public budgets. 
Benefits to be gained included salaries, public contracts, control over 
security forces, and per diems for various ad hoc tasks.
Third, like the rest of the country, major political decisions within 
the Somali Region are made and implemented through the ruling party 
structure rather than by representative institutions such as parliament 
or local government councils. Although an “actual overlap in person-
nel and functions”47 between political party, administration, and par-
liament exists, occupying an important position in the party hierarchy 
provides more decision-making power than the holding of office.
From the establishment of the region until its first-ever district elec-
tions in February 2004, zonal and district administrators and village 
chairmen were appointed through a top-down process. Senior politi-
cians at the regional level nominated their clients—usually persons 
loyal to the ruling party and representing the dominant clan lineage 
within a given territory—as local government officials. In the 2004 
local elections each district elected a council including a spokesman, 
vice-spokesman, administrator, and vice-administrator. These coun-
cils are charged with managing budgets and development activities 
within their respective constituencies. Despite the intention of cre-
ating representative institutions at district and regional levels, elec-
tions and appointments in Region 5 follow the careful pre-selection 
of candidates by party leaders. It is only after party endorsement that 
candidates will mobilize popular support from members of their local-
ity and clan lineage.48 While the ruling party (now SPDP, previously 
ESDL and ONLF) ensures political and ideological conformity from 
its headquarters in Jigjiga to the remote countryside, elders defend the 
interests of their lineage by lobbying for recruitment of their kin. As 
a result, nominations, elections, dismissals, and substitutions of local 
administrators in the Somali Region occur at the interface of party and 
genealogical interests. Senior government posts at the regional level 
(notably the heads of line bureaus) are all occupied by followers of the 
ruling party. Although the holders of these posts frequently rotate, a 
certain clan balance reflecting the approximate demographic size of 
the region’s clan groupings is respected in the apportionment of these 
treasured positions.
Since 1991, ethnically defined administration in Region 5 has mostly 
been understood as exclusive rule by a dominant group. Political 
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representation was equated with a clan lineage’s unchallenged con-
trol over its home territory. While clan “home” areas exist in Somali 
society, their borders are neither static nor definite, because pastoral 
production relies on mobility and flexible resource use arrangements, 
which changed over time. The establishment of a decentralized admin-
istration under the EPRDF embraced the delineation of districts and 
kebeles (the smallest administrative unit in the Ethiopian political sys-
tem) and their assignment to a distinct lineage. Violent land conflicts 
driven by the motive of territorial control rather than actual resource 
use thus becomes increasingly apparent.49 A case in point is the mas-
sive conflict between various sub-clans of the Reer Abdille sub-branch 
of the Ogaadeen and the Sheekhaash clan, which sought to establish 
its own district in East Imi in the Afder zone at the end of the 1990s. 
Repeated confrontations claimed several hundred casualties and had 
led by 2003 to the displacement of 14,000 persons.50 The restructur-
ing of the administration on an ethno-national basis was especially 
disadvantageous to (agro-)pastoral groups that shared a joint Somali-
Oromo identity, such as the Gabra, Garre, Jarso, Guura, or Guji. Prior to 
decentralization, strong alliances existed between Oromos and Somalis 
who rallied around a common Muslim-Cushitic identity and a joint 
struggle against highland domination. Somali-Oromo brotherliness in 
the eastern lowlands was decisively disrupted when communities had 
to settle for affiliation with either the Somali or the Oromiya region 
and, concomitantly, a Somali or Oromo identity.51 Numerous districts 
and kebeles along the Somali Region’s border are disputed between the 
Somali, Oromiya, and Afar regions. After a referendum on the status 
of over 400 kebeles along the Somali-Oromiya border in October 2004, 
Somalis accused their regional administration of betraying Somali 
interests by “illegally transferring” land to the neighboring Oromiya 
state.52 Government representatives have presented these border dis-
putes as a problem between local inhabitants. In actual fact, party and 
state officials as well as armed liberation movements have incited and 
nurtured these ethno-political conflicts by providing money, weap-
ons, and political support to their respective Somali and Oromo kin 
groups.53
IV. Federal Interventions and Security Concerns
The Ethiopian-Somali elite has been plagued by divisiveness and has 
lacked political finesse as well as bureaucratic skills ever since assum-
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ing control over the region in 1991. However, if public institutions 
have failed to live up to people’s needs and rights, internal political 
disorder is not the sole explanatory factor. Rather, the federal EPRDF 
regime regularly used coercive tactics in federal-regional interactions 
and increasingly intervened in regional matters in the course of the 
past decade. To be sure, both the imperial government and the Derg 
had, in typical centralist manner, regularly indulged in micromanag-
ing politics in the Ogaden. Contrary to the authoritarian nature of the 
past regimes, the TFG charter promised ethno-national self-govern-
ment and thus raised expectations for more autonomous decision-mak-
ing. At the beginning of EPRDF rule, federal meddling in Somali state 
affairs was rather minimal. After consolidating its power throughout 
the country and following the Somali call for secession in 1994, EPRDF 
partly reverted to its predecessors’ domestic policy in regard to the 
Somali periphery. National security concerns slowly but surely began 
to override the new rulers’ initial reform agenda toward the “backward 
region.” This included the containment of Somali nationalism and irre-
dentism, pre-emption of Islamic fundamentalism, and safeguarding 
access to the region’s unexploited natural energy reserves.54 Perhaps 
the most effective strategy by the central government has been the skil-
ful exploitation of competition and differences among the region’s clan 
lineages. The numerically smaller non-Ogaadeen groups voluntarily 
accepted federal patronage with the aim of gaining influence in the 
region.55 They managed to prevent the restoration of exclusive Ogaa-
deen rule following the downfall of the first ONLF administration in 
the mid-1990s. Unwittingly, they undermined regional autonomy by 
inviting the federal government to assume a position of arbitrator in 
the domestic game of clan rivalry and factionalism.56 Ethiopian-Soma-
lis’ inability to unite politically clearly benefited federal authorities. 
It allowed the continuation of the central government’s tradition of 
pitting one clan (or an alliance of Somali clans) against another. This 
provided a cost-effective way of exerting control over the vast Somali 
inhabited lowlands, where federal presence to this day is limited to 
military garrisons.
Upon further examination, federal interventions in the Somali 
Region go beyond simple divide-and-rule policies. Federal interests 
are ensured through subtle dealings within and outside the official 
channels linking federal and regional organs, as well as through out-
right dictation of policy and the threat or application of force. Federal 
authorities, specifically the Ministry of Federal Affairs, have developed 
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variegated tactics to secure influence over the Somali Region’s inter-
nal politics.57 These tactics operate at different levels and bring into 
play institutional, bureaucratic, political, financial, and military means. 
The most direct federal interventions were the successive removals 
of regional presidents and senior politicians. Only three of the nine 
regional presidents came to office through an election. The rest were 
handpicked and later ousted, either directly or with the blessing of 
EPRDF cadres in the federal government.58 Counterinsurgency cam-
paigns against the “anti-peace elements,” as ONLF fighters are euphe-
mistically called, represented another form of direct federal action. 
Army officials and regional militia have been involved in persecuting 
ONLF cadres and sympathizers ever since the fallout between ONLF 
and EPRDF in 1994. A striking parallel exists with the neighboring 
Oromiya region, where state-organized repression of the Oromo Lib-
eration Front (OLF) has reached significant dimensions among the 
population.59 In the case of the ONLF, the federal government pursued 
a double strategy. On the one hand, it isolated the more militant wing 
of ONLF and its allies from the political process, while concomitantly 
backing moderate Ogaadeen and non-Ogaadeen political interests. On 
the other hand, regional and federal security forces used military force 
against ONLF rebels and suspected sympathizers. Since the ONLF’s 
adoption of small-scale guerrilla warfare, both sides regularly claim 
victories in battles against their enemies. Although these claims are not 
confirmed by independent sources, it seems as if the ONLF is getting 
stronger in recent years, partly because of Eritrean military assistance.
Between 1998 and 2001 more discrete influence in regional deci-
sion making occurred through the deployment of “technical advisors.” 
Senior TPLF/EPRDF cadres of the Ministry of Federal Affairs were dis-
patched to “advise” regional presidents and bureau heads in the coun-
try’s peripheral regions.60 In Region 5, these party cadres ensured that 
their host state toe the line of the central government in all important 
policy matters. After a protest by regional administrations, the practice 
of dispatching federal advisors to regional capitals on a permanent basis 
was halted.61 However, the EPRDF continues to co-steer Somali Region 
affairs through its cadres, federal ministry bureaucrats, and through 
intellectual guidance—or rather political indoctrination—of SPDP and 
state officials. Another seemingly technical practice that allows federal 
authorities to have power over Ethiopian-Somali officials is gem gema, 
which roughly translates into criticism and self-criticism. Gem gema is 
used in meetings, particularly of the ruling party, whereby officials are 
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made to admit to committing unlawful acts, including corruption and 
other conduct unbecoming of a government official.62 The strategic 
value of this process is that it creates a criminal record for important 
politicians, thereby making them vulnerable to public ridicule and sus-
ceptible to federal pressures. In addition to these administrative proce-
dures, federal authorities purposely maintain direct relations with the 
region’s influential clan elders. Elders are canvassed in order to coun-
terbalance the state administration, particularly in order to increase 
pressure on the regional administration to implement policies advo-
cated by federal authorities.63 Through convocation of town hall meet-
ings in Jjgjiga, EPRDF officials have attempted to bring elders into the 
management of the Somali Region’s most pressing problems, namely 
decentralization, regional border disputes and, time and again, insecu-
rity. Many elders enjoy a kind of popular legitimacy and independent-
mindedness that the region’s top officials have lacked.
Countering Islamic fundamentalists has become another corner-
stone of the EPRDF’s agenda in dealing with its southeastern low-
lands. Over the past decade, the central government has maintained 
a rhetoric of imminent dangers posed to Ethiopia by adherents of Al-
Itihaad al-Islami (Islamic Union). Al-Itihaad had been created in the 
late 1980s by circles of Islamic study groups and Muslim Brotherhood 
cells, which were mainly composed of young, Saudi-educated Somali 
clerics following a puritanical salafist interpretation of Islam.64 Al-Iti-
haad established a branch in Region 5 in mid-1991 and was initially 
registered as a legal political party. Frictions between the TFG and 
Al-Itihaad appeared when the latter gradually militarized its activi-
ties and followers in 1992. Although several militant Somali Islamic 
organizations had appeared after the downfall of the Siyaad Barre 
regime, Al-Itihaad was the only group to pursue a truly regional and 
military strategy within the Somali-inhabited Horn of Africa.65 The 
EPRDF’s reaction to Al-Itihaad was as swift as it was violent. Between 
1992 and 1996, Ethiopia successfully destroyed Al-Itihaad’s military 
capabilities within Region 5, but also in the Gedo region of neighbor-
ing Somalia. With the advent of the U.S.-led “war on terror” in the 
aftermath of September 11 and speculations about al-Qa’eda cells in 
Somalia, the Ethiopian government was quick to label Al-Itihaad a 
terrorist organization and, on occasion, claimed that they had enlisted 
the financial and material support of foreign Islamists.66 The govern-
ment tried to exploit the global anti-terrorism discourse by portraying 
its ONLF and OLF armed opposition as terrorist organizations to the 
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domestic and international audience. By joining the global coalition 
against terrorism, the EPRDF secured American economic and military 
aid. By the end of 2003, U.S. marines had established small outposts, 
so-called “lily pads,” within the Somali Region where they monitor the 
Ethiopian-Somali border and implement minor development activities 
intended to win the sympathies of the local population.67
V. Between Integration, Independence, and Irredentism
Fifteen years after the establishment of the Somali Regional State and 
the official introduction of the concept of a “Somali nation” within the 
Ethiopian body politic, the question is to what degree, if at all, an Ethi-
opian-Somali identity has materialized. The constant flux of political 
developments in the Somali Region and the Horn of Africa as a whole 
defies sweeping generalizations on the topic. Bear in mind the proviso 
that one can distinguish between more exogenous and more endog-
enous narratives on the identity of Somalis in Ethiopia. Collective 
identity is a dynamic phenomenon, which is constantly constructed, 
deconstructed, and reconstructed. Therefore, it is of importance to con-
sider the totality of narratives, external and internal, pertaining to a 
group’s identity. How do outsiders apprehend the political orientation, 
actual and desired, of Region 5’s inhabitants? As the guarantor of eth-
nic federalism, the EPRDF federal government obviously propagates 
the maxim that Somalis are able to develop and promote their own cul-
ture and political identity while expressing allegiance to the Ethiopian 
state. Conversely and despite the official rhetoric, the majority of non-
Somali highland Ethiopians views all Somalis (whether living within 
or outside the country’s territory) as alien to Ethiopian nationhood. 
The Ogaden war is vividly remembered and Somalis are often por-
trayed as Ethiopia’s enemies. The Somali civil war and state collapse 
have enforced popular clichés of Somalis being an “anarchic,” “dan-
gerous,” and essentially “unreliable” people. The external recognition 
of an Ethiopian-Somali identity within Ethiopia is thus confined to the 
advocates of ethnic federalism, i.e., the politico-bureaucratic state elite.
Similarly, while a multitude of opinions exists among members of 
the global Somali diaspora,68 most reject the possibility of a distinct 
Ethiopian-Somali identity. In regard to the region’s political fate, the 
diaspora is divided between adherents of a more pan-Somali nation-
alist orientation and defenders of Ogaden self-determination. Those 
belonging to the first category consider Region 5 as part and par-
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cel of the colonially divided Somali nation and therefore refer to the 
Somali Region as Western Somalia (Soomaali Galbeed). In contrast, Oga-
den nationalists advocate self-determination on the basis of the entire 
Somali inhabited territory within Ethiopia. As a contributor to an 
online chat forum pointed out, “there is nothing called Somali galbeed, 
it is Ogadenia.”69 These narratives on Ethiopian-Somali, Ogaden, and 
Western Somali collective identity indicate the multiple and contested 
interpretations of who Somalis in Ethiopia are and who they might be. 
These divergences constitute the background for much of the region’s 
divided political leadership. The result is a fragmented polity that 
ranges from a minority sentiment of belonging to the Ethiopian nation-
state, to a strong drive for independence as fought for by the ONLF, to 
economic integration with parts of neighboring Somalia.
Overt pledges of allegiance to the Ethiopian nation-state by Ethio-
pian-Somalis are exceptional, often made with an ulterior motive and 
mostly restricted to members of the region’s ruling party and bureau-
cracy. Irrespective of the official idiom of “Ethiopian-Somaliness,” eco-
nomic and social integration into the Ethiopian highland economy 
characterizes some peripheral enclaves within the Somali region. Thus 
the Somali (-Oromo) agro-pastoralists of what was formerly known 
as East Hararghe, a territory stretching from the slopes of the Harar 
highlands to the confines of today’s Jigjiga zone, are more strongly 
involved in trade and exchange with the Ethiopian highlands than 
Somalis inhabiting the Haud and Ogaden plateau.70 Moreover, com-
munities living along the historic trade route between Harar and the 
port of Berbera in adjoining Somaliland share a sense of attachment 
to the Ethiopian highlands. The smaller Darood and Dir clan lineages 
inhabiting the northeastern fraction of the Somali Region have gener-
ally opted for a more conciliatory position towards the EPRDF govern-
ment. Arguably, they have done so because they fear marginalization 
by sectarian Ogaadeen nationalists, rather than due to sympathy for 
Ethiopian ethnic federalism.
The ONLF is the most prominent organization advocating self-
determination and ultimately independence for Region 5, or, as it 
calls it, “Ogadenia.” The ONLF’s origin is traced back to divisions 
that emerged during the 1980s within the region’s historic liberation 
front, the WSLF.71 The ONLF was clandestinely established in August 
1984 in Mogadishu. ONLF’s current deputy-chairman, Mohamed 
Ismail, proclaimed its formation, in 1986 in Algiers, as an opposition 
in exile, “accountable only to the people of Ogaden and independent 
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of any government in Mogadishu.”72 Contrary to the WSLF, which 
had sought reunification with Somalia, the ONLF demanded a pop-
ular plebiscite to decide whether “Ogadenia” should remain within 
Ethiopia, merge with Somalia, or aim for independence. Many of the 
ONLF’s founders had been educated in the 1960s and 1970s in Arab 
countries and some of them pursued Baathist and Islamist tenden-
cies. They distanced themselves from the older WSLF nationalists who 
had grown up during the heyday of Somali nationalism in the 1940s 
and 1950s and whose understanding of politics was strongly paro-
chial and clientelistic. The ONLF advocated a more dogmatic program 
based on Ogaadeen particularism. Initially, The ONLF concentrated on 
expanding and consolidating its organizational structure among the 
diaspora, where it deliberately recruited educated younger members 
of the Ogaadeen clan. In the mid-1980s, parts of ONLF also connected 
with radical Islamists of the future Al-Itihaad, who shared a similar 
aversion to pan-Somali nationalism rooted in genealogical interests.73
Via the massive wave of returnees to the Ogaden following Soma-
lia’s disintegration, the ONLF managed to establish a presence within 
the territory it sought to liberate. After falling out with the EPRDF and 
subsequent military confrontations, the ONLF split into different fac-
tions in 1995. The “hawks,” under the leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim 
Abdallah, took up armed struggle in the bush. A smaller faction, led by 
Bashir Abdi Hassan, sought a direct arrangement with the pro-EPRDF 
ESDL, while a third group of Ogaadeen intellectuals and business-
men aimed at a negotiated arrangement with the ESDL, while keeping 
ONLF’s organizational autonomy. Since the “outlawed” ONLF took to 
the bush, the organization’s further development has become rather 
opaque. The EPRDF succeeded in fragmenting the ONLF by engag-
ing its more moderate members in negotiations and into the region’s 
patronage and spoils system. This in turn radicalized the hard-liners 
within the ONLF, who managed to gradually increase their military 
strength and expand their operations in the past decade. The ONLF’s 
top leaders, including Chairman Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman, 
reside in Western countries such as Denmark, Germany, and the U.K. 
Their fighters operate a predominantly hit-and-run insurgency in Fiq, 
Korahe, Degehabur, Wardheer, and Godey zones of the region. In these 
areas the ONLF mostly draws on the popular support of members of 
the Ogaadeen clan lineages of Mohammed Zubeyr, Bah Gerri, Maka-
hil, and Tolomogge. With the help of this grassroots support, it is able 
to control the movement of people and goods in these areas. While 
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the ONLF’s military activities are limited, its network of informants 
and sympathizers covers almost the whole Somali Region. The ONLF 
claims to represent all Somalis living in Ethiopia but, in actual fact, 
most non-Ogaadeen do not support the ONLF, which they view as 
primarily defending the interests of Ogaadeen lineages. However, it 
would be wrong to assume that ONLF benefits from the unconditional 
support of all Ogaadeen. At any given point in the post-1991 era, Ogaa-
deen politicians and elders have defended positions across the entire 
political spectrum. The pro-EPRDF administrations in the region, from 
the ESDL to the SPDP, all included strong Ogaadeen representation. In 
recent years criticism of the ONLF has increasingly been expressed by 
Ethiopian-Somalis who question the expediency of pursuing an armed 
struggle instead of a political solution through negotiations with the 
federal government.
Political conditions since 1991 have not been conducive for Somalia’s 
irredentist claims to the Ogaden or an Ethiopian-Somali movement for 
reunification with Somalia. Over a dozen Somali peace processes have 
failed and Somali faction leaders have proven unable to reconcile and 
restore effective authority.74 In the continuous absence of an effective 
Somali central government and Somaliland’s secessionist drive, the 
quest to reunify all Somali-inhabited territories under one state has 
become temporarily moot. However, the collapse of the Somali Repub-
lic resulted in an unforeseen “Greater Somalia,” not on the basis of a 
political, but instead an economic integration. The complete privatiza-
tion of trade, transport, and finance boosted the free flow of goods, 
services, and information within the Somali-inhabited territories.75 
Region 5 is firmly embedded in this larger Somali political economy. 
Contraband smuggled into the region from Somaliland, Puntland, and 
central Somalia mainly consists of non-perishable food items, clothes, 
and electronic and consumer goods. In return, qat (a mildly narcotic 
leaf), livestock, and vegetables are exported along the trade routes con-
necting the Ogaden with Somalia’s commercial centers.76 The Somali 
and Somaliland shilling are widely used in the Somali Region as a 
parallel currency to the Ethiopian birr, which, although backed by the 
central government, is not available in large enough quantities. Cross-
border kin distribution further connects the regions’ inhabitants to 
neighboring Djibouti (the Issa and Gadabursi), Somaliland (the Gada-
bursi and Isaaq), Puntland (the Harti), central Somalia (the Hawiye, 
Marehan, Digil, Mirifle, and other kin groups) and northeast Kenya 
(groups belonging to the Daarood family as well as others). Although 
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the interactions within these clan territories are not irredentist in the 
conventional sense, they shape to a considerable degree Ethiopian-
Somali identity as members of a Somali common economic market.
VI. Continuities and Ruptures in the Ogaden
With the introduction of ethnic federalism, Ethiopia’s Somali Region 
underwent yet another twist in its intricate relations with the central 
government of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian highland. From the imperial 
governments of Menelik to Haile Selassie and from the Derg dictator-
ship of Mengistu Haile Mariam to the EPRDF’s revolutionary democ-
racy under Meles Zenawi, politics in the Ogaden have been repeatedly 
reconfigured, but have shown continuities that have transcended the 
various regimes. At the core of these continuities is the Somali Region’s 
character as a frontier space where the state’s judicial and bureaucratic 
forms of control have encountered rejection and outright resistance. 
The Somali Region is among Eastern Africa’s “pastoral fringe regions” 
that continuously challenge the national political structures of the cen-
tral state.77 The clash manifested between the Ethiopian state bureau-
cracy and Somali segmentary society is, however, not a zero-sum game 
between incompatible elements. As research from other parts of the 
world demonstrates, state institutions and clan-based kinship have 
their own historicity, are highly interrelated, and are mutually consti-
tutive rather than exclusive.78
Several continuities have marked the Ethiopian-Somali frontier 
since its annexation by the Ethiopian empire. First, state penetration 
has remained weak, with state institutions enjoying little legitimacy or 
significance for local communities. Somali elders manage community 
affairs on the basis of a customary cosmology, conflict resolution prac-
tices, and intergroup contracts (xeer). Second, the federal government 
exerts direct control and influence over the Somali Region via its mili-
tary garrisons as well as indirect rule through the region’s ruling party. 
The central state employs the stick more often than the carrot in trying 
to integrate the Somalis into the Ethiopian nation-state. Lastly, armed 
resistance to the “habesha” (highland rulers) and their Somali allies 
carries on in the form of the ONLF’s insurgency. The Ogaadeen rebels 
build upon popular frustration with the EPRDF government’s decep-
tive promises of genuine Somali self-determination and democratiza-
tion. Beyond these permanencies, different rulers and regimes at the 
center of the Ethiopian state have transformed relations with its Somali 
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periphery and the politics therein. To clarify, the following phases of 
Ethiopian rule in its Somali-inhabited territory can be differentiated.79 
Between 1850 and 1920, governance in the Ogaden was characterized 
by a fiscal-military mode. The region was victim to predatory behav-
ior by imperial soldiers who collected taxes and livestock by raiding 
Somali pastoralists. In the second phase, between 1920 and 1977, the 
central government partly replaced the military-fiscal mode with an 
effort to increase bureaucratic control over the region from the center. 
Selective repression continued, but the imperial government increas-
ingly engaged in patrimonial relations with loyal Ethiopian-Somali 
leaders and clan groups who were co-opted into the provincial admin-
istration.
The period between 1977 and 1991, under the Derg and following 
the traumatic Ogaden war, was dominated by systematic repression 
of Ethiopian-Somali dissent and resistance. Garrison socialism and 
counterinsurgency strategies made the inclusion of Somalis into local 
governance impossible. In the most recent phase, since 1991, Ethio-
pian-Somalis have directly administered their regional state within a 
federal framework. As this article argues, this democratic experiment 
reverted to more manipulative interventions by federal authorities in 
the mid-1990s. Today the central government applies a mixture of pat-
rimonial and coercive tactics that are a reminder of the second phase 
(1920–1977) of Ethiopian rule over the Ogaden.
To conclude, Geshekter’s prognosis, made two decades ago, that 
“an Ethiopian state whose rulers permitted Somali self-determina-
tion would implicitly consent to its own territorial disintegration” has 
proven quite accurate.80 Although Ethiopian-Somalis formally enjoy 
autonomy and self-government, the EPRDF has made sure that politi-
cal developments within the region do not depart from its agenda. 
Behind the curtains of decentralized democracy, federal authorities call 
the tunes, with the regional government as the involuntary conductor 
faced with an increasingly frustrated Somali audience.
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